originally published 12/3/10
If, as a result of the man-caused WikiLeaks disaster, you have recently begun to think thoughts like "Why would our government even think about putting secure and sensitive information someplace where it could later be compromised?" perhaps you should have been paying closer attention when universal health care zealots were touting the glorious benefits of data-basing more than a quarter-billion living Americans' medical records "So they can be available in real time 24/7/365 to any provider who NEEDS them."
Of course, the socialized medicine crowd never mentioned that your personal records would continue to be accessible in perpetuity and that pre-edited
versions of any files are never completely erased from the giant Triple-W hard drive in cyberspace -- just as is the case with the documents that have been launched up to WikiLeaks.
They would have called you a conspiracy theorist, for sure, had you criticized some of the noncensical questions on your 2010 Census questionnaire.
So if you think that what needs to be done next is to create some kind of flow chart or score card to place blame on the miscreants who enabled the dissemination of those seditious WikiLeaks documents then, once again, the essence of what really should be overhauled in order to "prevent an emergency from becoming a catastrophe" has escaped you.
It is the paradox of an oversized government with undersized bureaucrat accountability that has enabled both the ridiculous, wasteful warehousing of sensitive files as well as the ultimate falling into the wrong hands of this type of material.
In the lead-up to the attacks on the World Trade Center and The Pentagon there were government operatives who actually had a handle on what was being planned by al Qaida. However, due to inter-agency rivalry and power struggles later uncovered by the 9/11 Commission, their potentially life-saving information was never properly conveyed to either the Clinton or Bush White House.
Why do government employees do what they do? Because they can.
Federal employees hope to retain and increase both their position and power by keeping their own bureaucratic sub-niches more necessary and powerful than the next fed's. "It's a dog eat dog world" they might say. Unfortunately for the rest of us, there can be no extortion in the absence of extortion-able information. Likewise, there will never be an information transfer failure unless someone mishandles or self-servingly suppresses the information.
As a hands-on website operator, some of the things that puzzle me most about WikiLeaks might not even occur to others.
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Where does one find a host and/or servers capable of holding MILLIONS of web files and sustaining them online for thousands of visitors at any given moment?
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How large a staff does it take to format and launch this incredibly large quantity of material?
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From what locations was WikiLeaks able to acquire these files?
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Why couldn't the government have prevented access to these files and documents -- at least the more recently published ones?